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21. Introduction
At the centre of the discussion on financial stability is the question of how much
capital and reserves banks should be required to hold. A system with a buffer too
small might be crisis-prone and in need of regular bail-outs. On the other hand, too
much might render unprofitable large parts of the banking business. In this context,
capital requirements are one of the most important instruments and address banks’
balance sheets directly. Yet they comprise just another of two distinct well-known
regulatory instruments. Reserve requirements have traditionally been used, though
not necessarily with a sole financial stability objective.
Both requirements concern the composition of banks’ balance sheets. Changing
one of them simply has a mirror image effect as the other, since both are defined as
ratios between asset and liability categories. For both requirements, an increase is
associated with a balance sheet tightening. The similarity of the effects of changes in
either of the two regulatory requirements on banks’ balance sheets motivates a joint
assessment of their effects. The effects of capital requirements on lending rates and
financial stability have been analysed extensively in the literature (see Gambacorta
and Karmakar, 2018; Repullo and Suarez, 2013; Covas and Fujita, 2010; VanHoose,
2007, for an overview). In contrast, reserve requirements have not yet been assessed
in this context. Against this background, the aim of this study is to evaluate the
effects of reserve requirements on the probability of bank failure.
As reserve requirements are the key element in characterising a fractional banking
system, they have hence been analysed from the perspective of an instrument for
monetary policy for a long time (see for instance Day, 1986; Vernon, 1990; Davis
and Toma, 1995; Haslag and Young, 1998; Faig and Gagnon, 2008; Carpenter and
Demiralp, 2012; Dutkowsky and VanHoose, 2013; Hendrickson, 2017; Armenter and
Lester, 2017). The experience of emerging market economies has induced a change
in the perception of the usefulness of reserve requirements (Hoffmann and Lo¨ﬄer,
2014). The recent literature highlights the importance of reserve requirements as
a means to foster financial stability, which is motivated by the fact that reserve
requirements operate directly on the narrow credit channel defined by the supply
reaction of bank credit to a change in available funds (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991;
Stein, 1998; Diamond and Rajan, 2011; Calomiris et al., 2015).
3A series of recent theoretical papers has assessed the ability of reserve require-
ments to promote financial stability for which most of them rely on dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. In this context, Glocker and Towbin
(2012); Mimir et al. (2013); Ireland (2014); De Carvalho et al. (2013); Bustamante
and Hamann (2015); Primus (2017); Age´nor et al. (2018); Adrian and Boyarchenko
(2018); Imhof et al. (2018); Yang and Yi (2019); Mimir and Sunel (2019); Silva Vin-
hado and Divino (2019), among others, find that reserve (or liquidity) requirements
have the ability to contain the degree of procyclicality of the financial system and by
this to foster financial stability. The argument is that reserve requirements can serve
as a countercyclical tool to manage the credit cycle in a broad context, limiting the
excessive leverage of borrowers in the upswing and operating as a liquidity buffer in
the downswing.
The empirical literature generally confirms these findings. In particular, Montoro
and Moreno (2011); Tovar et al. (2012); Glocker and Towbin (2015); Funga´c˘ova´ et
al. (2016); Becker et al. (2017); Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2019); Dassatti Camors et
al. (2019) provide empirical evidence highlighting that spikes in reserve requirements
are likely to exert a downward pressure on loans and upward pressure on lending
rates. Kashyap and Stein (2012) stress the importance of reserve requirement poli-
cies to augment the possibilities of central banks to achieve financial stability. They
argue that reserve requirements could be considered as a Pigouvian tax used to in-
ternalise the externalities generated by a high short-term debt exposure of financial
intermediaries.1
Common to this literature is (i) their perception of reserve requirements as an
adequate instrument for financial stability purposes, (ii) their focus on the macroe-
conomy and (iii) the absence of an explicit measure for financial stability. In line with
most studies, Barroso et al. (2017), Andries et al. (2018) and Alper et al. (2018) find
that reserve requirements affect credit growth, most importantly, they document an
effect on risk-taking by banks. They stress that banks that are more affected by
1There is also a growing empirical literature assessing the usefulness of reserve requirements in
attenuating foreign capital inflows (see for instance Brei and Moreno, 2018, for an overview) and
there is also increased interest on this issue in the context of measuring financial market stress. A
potentially important reason for reserve holding in excess of required reserves is the precautionary
saving motive. This renders feasible the use of (excess) reserves to capture financial market stress
(van Roye, 2011; Glocker and Kaniovski, 2014).
4countercyclical reserve requirements avoid riskier firms, showing that higher reserve
requirements are likely to mitigate bank risk-taking. However, in contrast, the re-
sults of Ely et al. (2019), Dassatti Camors et al. (2019) and Jime´nez et al. (2017)
point towards the opposite. They document a “search-for-yield” effect (that is, a
positive risk-taking response) to the tightening of reserve requirements.2 This raises
questions about the (i) presence of a risk-shifting effect and (ii) the ability of reserve
requirements to promote financial stability.
We analyse under which circumstances reserve requirements promote financial
stability, which we assess by means of the probability of bank failure. To that
purpose, we consider a banking model of Cournot competition within a perfectly
competitive market for loans. Banks have zero intermediation costs, are funded
with fully insured deposits and equity capital. We introduce a central authority
which, apart from the interest rate, sets legal reserve requirements. We extend the
model along two dimensions. The first dimension addresses the risk environment.
The differing results found for the effects of capital requirements on bank risk-taking
are due to different modelling approaches (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011). In the first
type of models, banks solve a portfolio problem. They hold a portfolio of projects and
choose the degree of riskiness of these projects. Given limited liability and deposit
insurance, banks are subject to a risk-shifting problem (see for instance Keeley, 1990;
Hellmann et al., 2000; Repullo, 2004). In the second type of models, banks solve
an optimal contracting problem (see for instance Boyd et al., 2006; Mart´ınez-Miera
and Repullo, 2010). They extend loans to entrepreneurs who determine the risk of
their projects. In this environment entrepreneurs are now subject to a risk-shifting
problem which is influenced by banks’ lending rates.
The second dimension addresses the role of differing degrees of loan default corre-
lation. Mart´ınez-Miera and Repullo (2010) have stressed the importance of higher
interest revenues from non-defaulting loans in curbing losses from defaulting loans
in the context of competition and bank failure. As changes in reserve requirements
are likely to affect lending rates in the first place, the effect of changes in reserve
2In line with this Nguyen and Boateng (2015, 2019) also provide empirical evidence in favour of a
“search-for-yield” effect. They find that higher reserves (in particular involuntary (excess) reserves)
may promote risk-taking behaviour which can be detrimental to financial stability.
5requirements might affect banking stability beyond the risk-shifting effect arising
from the entrepreneur’s reaction to changes in lending rates.
For ease of comparison, we also consider capital requirements as an additional
regulatory element. This allows us to relate the effects of reserve and capital re-
quirements to each other and to assess their mutual dependency.
To preview some results, we find that in general higher reserve requirements pro-
mote risk-taking as either entrepreneurs or banks have an incentive to choose riskier
assets, so banks’ probability of failure rises. The intuition for this is the following.
To the extent that higher reserve requirements raise costs, banks and entrepreneurs
try to counterbalance them by financing assets with a higher success return. These
assets, however, are characterised by a higher probability of default. Hence, there
is a risk-shifting effect. This effect is attenuated once imperfectly correlated loan
default is allowed for. In particular, as higher reserve requirements induce a shift
towards assets with a higher success return, the corresponding increase in interest
payments from non-defaulting loans provides a buffer to cover losses from default-
ing loans. This effect is opposite to the risk-shifting effect and hence dampens the
adverse effects of higher reserve requirements on the probability of bank failure.
In contrast, the adverse effects are augmented once entrepreneurs’ moral hazard
problem is taken into account.
Interestingly, even though changes in capital and reserve requirements have com-
parably similar effects on banks’ balance sheets, their implications for financial sta-
bility are rather distinct. While both requirements affect loan supply and the lend-
ing rate in the same way, reserve requirements promote risk-taking, whereas capital
requirements (mostly) mitigate risk-taking.
With this in mind, the results presented here are in stark contrast to those of the
previously cited theoretical papers. In these studies, spikes in reserve requirements
trigger increases in lending rates followed by a corresponding decline in loans. The
drop therein reduces entrepreneurs’ leverage, which is associated with an improve-
ment in financial stability. This is not the case in the present context. The reason is
that we take entrepreneurs’ and banks’ moral hazard problem into account. When
higher reserve requirements raise refinancing costs, entrepreneurs and banks are
6now choosing assets with a higher success return. These assets, however, are char-
acterised by a higher probability of default, rendering worse the overall conditions
for financial stability.
The main policy implication from this study concerns the role of reserve require-
ments for procyclicality. So far, the literature argues that reserve requirements serve
to attenuate excessive leverage and thus to manage the credit cycle. What previous
studies ignore, though, is the possibility of a risk-shifting effect. As higher reserve
requirements promote risk-taking, an increase during the upswing of the cycle could
lead to an even stronger appetite for risk and thus to unintended policy outcomes.
In this environment, a reduction in reserve requirements rather than an increase
might attenuate the degree of procyclicality.
This paper further relates to the literature on banks’ portfolio choice and liquidity
holdings. Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) study an environment where banks can
insure against withdrawal shocks by sharing liquid resources, but aggregate liquidity
is inefficiently low because banks free-ride on each other’s liquidity. Most closely
related to this paper are the contributions by Kara and Ozsoy (2016); Pichler and
Lutz (2017); Repullo (2005). Kara and Ozsoy (2016) study the optimal design of
capital and liquidity regulations as well as the interaction between the two in a
model with fire-sale externalities. Pichler and Lutz (2017) argue that bank capital
requirements, outright caps on borrowing, or Pigouvian taxes on debt are no longer
appropriate regulatory instruments under idiosyncratic liquidity risk. Instead, the
macroprudential regulator must ensure sufficient liquidity in the banking system.
Repullo (2005) studies banks’ decision on the liquidity buffer that it wants to hold
and the risk of its asset portfolio within an environment where deposits are randomly
withdrawn and a lender of last resort (LLR). The key findings are that (i) the
equilibrium choice of risk is shown to be decreasing in the capital requirement and
increasing in the interest rate charged by the LLR, and (ii) the presence of an LLR
does not increase the incentives to take risk.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 considers the effects of re-
serve requirements within a risk environment characterized by the optimal portfolio
problem and assesses the role of imperfectly correlated loan default in an extension.
7Section 3 addresses the effects of reserve requirements in a risk environment of op-
timal contracting and pays particular attention to the role of entrepreneurs’ moral
hazard problem. Section 4 considers the relevance of imperfectly correlated loan de-
fault within a risk environment characterized by the optimal contracting problem.
Section 5 provides some general discussion and Section 6 concludes.
2. Portfolio problem
This section analyses the implications of reserve requirements within a model setup
that is based on the idea that banks can decide upon how much risk to accept in
their loan portfolio. In these models, banks explicitly choose an optimal level of risk.
The level chosen, depends on, among others, the stance of prudential policy. In this
kind of models, it is generally found that capital requirements tend to mitigate bank
risk-taking, rendering this tool useful for prudential regulation. For our assessment
on the effects of reserve requirements, we differentiate between perfect and imperfect
correlation in loan defaults, which allows to evaluate the role of interest revenues
from non-defaulting loans.
2.1. Reserves, capital and bank risk-taking. We start with a simple model
which serves to highlight the basic difference between reserve and capital require-
ments concerning their ability to promote financial stability. Consider a model with
two dates (t = 0, 1). Banks operate in perfectly competitive markets and raise de-
posits D and equity capital E at date t = 0 and invest the proceeds in loans L to
firms that yields a stochastic gross return at date t = 1. We assume zero interme-
diation costs. Banks’ deposits are insured by a government-funded deposit scheme
and they are in perfectly elastic supply at a deposit rate rD. Additionally, deposits
are subject to reserve regulation, which requires banks to hold a fraction ς ∈ (0, 1)
of deposits at an account at the central bank in the form of reserves R = ςD. This
amount is assumed to receive a return equal to rR and is out of a bank’s free dis-
posal. We assume that deposits are insured at a flat premium which is zero. The
balance sheet for a bank reads as follows
(1) (1− ς)D = (1− k)L
8where k = E/L ∈ (0, 1) is the capital ratio. The fraction (1− ς)/(1− k) determines
the loan-to-deposit ratio (L/D). Banks’ equity capital is provided by bankers who
require an expected rate of return δ > rD on their investment. The rationale behind
assuming a strictly positive δ is given by Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997) and Diamond
and Rajan (2000), among others. The excess cost of bank capital δ is intended to
capture in a reduced-form manner distortions such as agency costs of equity, which
imply a comparative disadvantage of equity financing relative to deposit financing.
Banks are managed in the interest of their shareholders, who are protected by
limited liability. Each period bankers have to decide how many deposits D and how
much capital E to hold. Due to limited liability, the net worth of each bank – that
is, gross loan returns minus gross deposit returns plus the returns on reserves – will
then be distributed to bankers if it is positive, otherwise they receive zero. Bankers
maximize the expected value of this payoff discounted at the rate δ and net of their
initial contribution of capital. Prudential regulation requires banks to hold some
minimum of reserves and capital.
A bank receives a return α(p) if the investment is successful, where 1−p determines
the success of an investment project; if not successful, the bank gets α(p) = 0 with
probability p
(2) R˜ =

 α(p), with probability 1− p0, with probability p
The probability of failure p ∈ (0, 1) is privately chosen by the bank. Following Allen
and Gale (2001, Chapter 8), we assume that α(p) is concave with α′(0) > 1 + α(0),
so riskier projects have a higher success return. The net worth π(p) of a bank per
unit of loan is given by
(3) π(p) = (1− p)
(
1 + α(p)− (1 + rD)1− k
1− ς + (1 + rR)ς
1− k
1− ς
)
The first term 1 + α(p) is the success return of an investment project, the second
term captures the payments to depositors and the third term captures the return on
required reserves where the amount of required reserves is given by ς 1−k
1−ς
. In what
follows we make two assumptions. First, we assume that changes in reserve and
capital requirements do not induce adjustment costs. Second, we assume that the
9return on reserves rR is zero; hence the success return of the asset, or put differently,
the lending rate (α(p) > 0) and the deposit rate (rD > 0) are to be understood as
excess returns. This simplifies the net worth equation to the following
(4) π(p) = (1− p)
(
α(p) + k − rD 1− k
1− ς
)
The bank competes in a Cournot fashion and chooses capital k, reserves ς and the
risk level p in order to maximise the present discounted value
(5) V = max
{k,ς,p}
[
−k + 1
1 + δ
π(p)
]
where the volume of loans L has been normalised to unity. The first order conditions
read
∂V
∂ς
= −rD (1− p)(1− k)
(1 + δ)(1− ς)2 < 0(6)
∂V
∂k
= −1 + (1− p)(1 + rD − ς)
(1 + δ)(1− ς) < 0(7)
Considering the first order condition with respect to the reserve ratio ς, if p → 0
then ∂V
∂ς
= −rD 1−k(1+δ)(1−ς)2 < 0, implying that if the loan default probability goes
to zero, the bank wants to hold zero reserves. However, if p → 1 then ∂V
∂ς
= 0,
implying that the bank accepts holding reserves if all loans default. In what follows,
we exclude this boundary solution and consider p ∈ [0, 1) only.
The inequality in the first order condition with respect to the capital ratio k
applies if 1+δ−(1−rD)(1−p)
δ+p
> ς, which will always hold for reasonable values of p and
ς given that δ > rD. Hence the bank holds the minimum amount of capital and
reserves as required by the regulation on capital and reserves.
To better understand the first order condition with respect to capital k, note that
if ς = 0, then we have that ∂V
∂k
= −1 + (1−p)(1−rD)
1+δ
< 0. If p < 1, then ∂V
∂k
< 0 even
when δ = rD, that is, when the owners of the bank do not require a higher rate of
return than depositors. This is because in this case deposits would still be a cheaper
source of finance since they are covered by deposit insurance in case of bank failure.
If p→ 0 then ∂V
∂k
= −1+ 1+rD−ς
(1+δ)(1−ς)
< 0, implying that if the loan default probability
goes to zero, the bank wants to hold zero capital. If p → 1 we have that ∂V
∂k
= −1
implying that the bank refrains from holding capital when all loans default. Again,
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this is because in this case deposits would be a cheaper source of finance than equity
capital due to deposit insurance.
The first order condition with respect to the risk level p reads
(8) (1− p)α′(p)− α(p) = k − rD 1− k
1− ς
Notice that the corner p = 0 cannot be a solution if α′(0) − α(0) − γ > 0 with
γ ≡ k − rD 1−k1−ς , which holds by the assumption α′(0) > 1 + α(0) and the corner
p = 1 cannot be a solution because −(α(1) + γ) < 0. Hence the bank will choose
a probability of failure p(γ) ∈ (0, 1). Taking the total differential and re-arranging
gives the following comparative statics
dp(k, ς)
dk
=
1 + rD − ς
1− ς
1
(1− p)α′′(p)− 2α′(p) < 0(9)
dp(k, ς)
dς
= −rD 1− k
1− ς
1
(1− p)α′′(p)− 2α′(p) > 0(10)
Equation (9) implies that higher capital requirements mitigate banks’ moral hazard
problem and hence the incentive for excessive risk-taking. This result has been
documented in the literature (see VanHoose, 2007, for an overview). In contrast,
equation (10) implies that higher reserve requirements promote risk-taking. The
intuition for this result is the following: Higher reserve requirements imply that only
a part of the stock of deposits can be used for loan supply in order to make profits,
however, that part of deposits which has to be hold as reserve still incurs costs equal
to rD. Banks try to compensate this loss by financing loans with a higher success
return. These loans, however, are characterised by a higher probability of default,
which in turn reduces the quality of banks’ loan portfolios. As a consequence, higher
reserve requirements do not mitigate bank risk-taking in this environment.
In this setup, the effects of changes in reserve requirements on the probability of
bank failure are similar to those of changes in the deposit rate rD. To see this, note
that from equation (8) we have that
(11)
dp(·)
drD
= −1− k
1− ς
1
(1− p)α′′(p)− 2α′(p) > 0
This again highlights the prevalence of the risk-shifting effect in response to changes
in the cost structure.
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This simple outline serves as an example where the implications of reserve require-
ments stand in stark contrast to those of capital requirements as regards their effect
on the stability of banks. The model setup considered here is though fairly simplistic
rendering feasible the potential that its implications are too model-specific. For this
the following sections consider various extensions.
2.2. The role of imperfectly correlated loan default. The previous section’s
analysis is based on the assumption of perfect correlation in loan defaults. In this
case, loans’ probability of default coincides with banks’ probability of failure. When
the risk inherent to loans is increasing in the lending rate, then lower rates reduce
banks’ revenues from non-defaulting loans which provide a buffer to cover loan losses.
If loan defaults were not perfectly correlated, increases in reserve requirements could
have an effect on bank stability beyond the standard risk-shifting effect outlined
previously. In particular, as higher reserve requirements induce a shift towards assets
with a higher success rate of return, the corresponding increase in interest payments
from non-defaulting loans can provide a buffer to cover losses from defaulting loans,
so banks would be less risky. This effect is opposite to the risk-shifting effect.
In an extension to the model outlined in Section 2.1, we now consider an en-
vironment in which firms and banks are exposed to a macroeconomic risk factor
z ∼ N(0, 1). Credit risk follows the Vasicek (2002) model, based on the Merton
(1974) model of credit risk. The model considers a continuum of firms that have a
project that requires a unit investment at date t = 0 and yields a stochastic return
R˜ at date t = 1:
(12) R˜ =

 1 + α, with probability 1− p1− λ, with probability p
where again p is the (unconditional) probability of default (PD), λ is the loss given
default (LGD) and 1 + α is the gross return of the project in case of success. The
assumption of identical firms implies that they all choose the same probability of
default p. Then the fraction x of projects that fail (in other words, the aggregate
failure rate) is only a function of the realization of the macroeconomic risk factor z.
In particular, by the law of large numbers, the aggregate failure rate x coincides with
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the probability of failure of a representative project i conditional on the macroeco-
nomic risk factor z. In this respect, the probability distribution of the aggregate
failure rate x is the one derived from the single-risk-factor model of Vasicek (2002)
that is used subsequently. Its cumulative distribution function is given by
(13) F (x) = Φ
(√
1− ϱ Φ−1(x)− Φ−1(p)√
ϱ
)
where Φ(·) denotes the distribution function of a standard normal random variable,
p is the unconditional probability of project default, ϱ ∈ [0, 1] is the loan exposure to
the macroeconomic risk factor z and x is the aggregate failure rate. F (x) captures
the cumulative distribution function of loan losses on a large loan portfolio. The
environment of the model of Section 2.1 can be replicated in the present setup when
ϱ → 1 (perfectly correlated failures), as in this case the distribution of the failure
rate x approaches the limit F (x) = Φ(−Φ−1(p)) = 1 − Φ(Φ−1(p)) = 1 − p, for
0 ≤ x ≤ 1. The mass point at x = 0 implies that with probability 1− p no project
fails and the mass point at x = 1 implies that with probability p all projects fail.
A detailed derivation of equation (13) together with a discussion as regards the
properties of the function F (x) is outlined in Section A of the Appendix.
The structure of the banking sector is similar as outlined in Section 2.1 with
minor modifications to account for imperfectly correlated loan default. When a firm
succeeds with its investment project, the bank gets 1 + r while when it fails, the
bank recovers 1−λ, hence λ is the loss given default. As before, r can be considered
as an excess lending rate. The bank’s net worth (or available capital) per unit of
loan is given by:
π(x) = (1− x)(1 + r) + x(1− λ)− 1− k
1− ς (1 + rD − ς)
= r + k − x(λ+ r)− rD 1− k
1− ς(14)
where the loan default rate x is a random variable whose conditional distribution
function is given by equation (13). As in Section 2.1 we normalize the stock of
loans L to unity. The first term, (1 − x)(1 + r), in equation (14) is the payoff of
non-defaulted loans, the second term, x(1− λ), is the payoff of defaulted loans, and
the third term, (1 + rD − ς)1−k1−ς , is the cost of deposits taking into account reserve
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holdings. The bank’s objective is to maximize the expected discounted value of
max(π(x), 0) net of bankers’ initial infusion of capital:
(15) V = −k + 1
1 + δ
E [max(π(x), 0)] = −k + 1
1 + δ
∫ xˆ
−∞
π(x)dF (x)
where xˆ denotes the critical value of x for which π(x) = 0. The bank maximizes the
expected discounted value V with respect to the amount of capital k and reserves
ς; optimization yields:
∂V
∂ς
= −rD 1− k
(1 + δ)(1− ς)2
∫ xˆ
−∞
dF (x) < 0(16)
∂V
∂k
= −1 + 1 + rD − ς
(1 + δ)(1− ς)
∫ xˆ
−∞
dF (x) < 0(17)
These two equations are equivalent to equation (6) and (7) with the implication that
banks will always hold the minimum amount of capital and reserves as required by
the regulation. As in Section 2.1, banks decide upon the level of risk which they are
still willing to accept. In the present context, they choose the bankruptcy/default
rate xˆ which characterizes the probability of bank failure in relation to the aggregate
failure rate x. It is given by the solution to ∂V/∂xˆ
!
= 0 which yields the following
equilibrium condition for the bankruptcy/default rate
xˆ =
1
λ+ r
(
k + r − rD 1− k
1− ς
)
(18)
Intuitively, if x > xˆ, the liabilities of a bank are larger than its assets. In this case
the bank will fail and be of zero net worth. Given that xˆ denotes the critical value of
the aggregate failure rate x for which π(x) = 0, a bank defaults if the failure rate x is
larger then the bankruptcy/default rate xˆ defined in equation (18). This implies that
the probability of bank failure is given by FB(xˆ) = Pr(x ≥ xˆ) = 1−F (xˆ). Hence, a
higher bankruptcy/default rate xˆ allows banks to accept a higher aggregate failure
rate x without yet getting bankrupt; by equation (18) the bankruptcy/default rate
xˆ is increasing in the lending rate r and the capital requirement k and decreasing
in the reserve requirement ς.
Finally, under perfect competition, the equilibrium lending rate r is determined by
the zero net value condition V = 0. Otherwise the market for loans would not clear
and banks would either want to expand their loan portfolio to infinity (if V > 0)
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or to not lend at all (if V < 0).3 The zero net value condition V = 0 gives the
equilibrium lending rate r as a solution to the following equation
(19) k =
1
1 + δ
∫ xˆ
0
(
k + r − x(λ+ r)− rD 1− k
1− ς
)
dF (x)
Using integration by parts and the equilibrium condition for the bankruptcy/default
rate, equation (19) can be written more compactly in the following form
(20) k =
1
1 + δ
∫ xˆ
0
(λ+ r)F (x)dx
The complete model consists of equations (13), (18) and (20) which comprises a
system of three equations with three variables (r, xˆ and F (xˆ) with FB(xˆ) = 1 −
F (xˆ)). In what follows, we analyse the implications of changes in reserve and capital
requirements on the probability of bank failure FB(xˆ).
2.2.1. Implications of the model. From the definition of the probability of bank fail-
ure we have
dFB
dς
= −Φ
′(·)√
ϱ
√
1− ϱ
Φ′(Φ−1(xˆ))
∂xˆ
∂ς
(21)
dFB
dk
= −Φ
′(·)√
ϱ
√
1− ϱ
Φ′(Φ−1(xˆ))
∂xˆ
∂k
(22)
where we used the rules of differentiation of inverse functions. Since Φ′(·) is the
density function of a standard normal random variable, the sign of equation (21)
and (22) hence depends on the sign of ∂xˆ/∂ς and ∂xˆ/∂k. Considering the latter
first, we denote the equilibrium interest rate with r∗ and obtain from equation (18)
(23)
∂xˆ
∂k
=
1
λ+ r∗
(
(1− xˆ)∂r
∗
∂k
+
1 + rD − ς
1− ς
)
with ∂r
∗
∂k
= 1
φ(xˆ)
(
1 + δ − F (xˆ)1+rD−ς
1−ς
)
, where φ(xˆ) ≡ ∫ xˆ
0
(1−x)dF (x) > 0. Obviously,
∂r∗
∂k
> 0 if −1+ 1+rD−ς
(1+δ)(1−ς)
F (xˆ) < 0, which replicates the assumption made in equation
(17) and hence ∂r
∗
∂k
> 0. This, in turn, implies that ∂xˆ
∂k
> 0 from which follows that
dFB(xˆ)/dk = −dF (xˆ)/dk < 0. This result replicates the findings in Repullo and
Suarez (2004) and Kiema and Jokivuolle (2014). Intuitively, if banks are required to
increase their capital ratio, they will charge higher lending rates, so the net interest
3If the stock of loans L was not normalized to unity, then this condition could be derived from the
first order condition of the expected discounted value V with respect to loans L.
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income earned on performing loans will be higher. This implies a lower probability of
failure as the bankruptcy/default rate is increasing in both the capital requirement
(k) and the lending rate (r).
For reserve requirements ς we obtain
(24)
∂xˆ
∂ς
=
1
λ+ r∗
(
(1− xˆ)∂r
∗
∂ς
− rD 1− k
(1− ς)2
)
Since ∂r
∗
∂ς
= rD(1−k)F (xˆ)
φ(xˆ)(1−ς)2
> 0, we observe that ∂xˆ
∂ς
R 0 as the sign of the term in paren-
theses in equation (24) is in principle ambiguous. As a consequence, dFB(xˆ)/dς =
−dF (xˆ)/dς R 0 implying that, as a result of an increase in reserve requirements, the
probability of bank failure can increase, decrease or remain unchanged. Intuitively,
if banks are required to increase their reserve ratio, they will charge higher lending
rates, so that the net interest income earned on performing loans will be higher
– this is captured by the first term in parentheses. Higher reserve requirements
lead to higher lending rates and consequently higher revenues from non-defaulting
loans. This provides a buffer against the losses from defaulting loans rendering
banks less risky. In contrast to that, the second term in parentheses captures the
negative cost effect which, as already outlined in Section 2.1, incentivizes banks to
accept assets with a higher success return; these assets are, however, riskier, which
finally implies a higher probability of bank failure. Since the bankruptcy/default
rate is decreasing in the reserve requirement (ς) but increasing in the lending rate
(r), a higher reserve ratio hence implies a higher probability of failure, whereas
the increase in the lending rate implies a lower probability of failure. In principle,
these two opposing effects render uncertain the overall impact on the probability of
bank failure, however, the risk-shifting effect in equation (24) still dominates, which
implies: ∂xˆ
∂ς
= −rD(1−k)
φ(xˆ)(1−ς)2
∫ xˆ
0
F (x)dx < 0. However, we note that
(25)
∂xˆ
∂k
≫
∣∣∣∣∂xˆ∂ς
∣∣∣∣ →
∣∣∣∣dFB(xˆ)dk
∣∣∣∣≫ dFB(xˆ)dς
In fact, since |dxˆ/dς| is comparably small, changes in reserve requirements trigger
negligibly small changes in the probability of bank failure, which is due to the
two aforementioned opposing effects. To show this, we proceed by using numerical
techniques and simulate the model by varying capital and reserve requirements over
a reasonable range.
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2.2.2. Numerical results. We follow Repullo and Suarez (2004) to calibrate the
model and utilize commonly used values for the structural parameters.4 We set
the cost of bank capital δ equal to 0.1 and the exposure ϱ to the common risk factor
equal to 0.5. The LGD parameter λ is set equal to 0.45 and the deposit rate rD
equal to 0.05. We set the capital and reserve ratios equal to 0.1. Finally, we are left
with the probability of default p for which we choose various different values (0.05,
0.10, 0.15). Note that these parameter values are chosen for the sole purpose of
illustrating the possible shapes of the relationship between the reserve and capital
requirements and the risk of bank failure. They are not intended to produce realistic
values of variables such as the loan rate r, the probability of loan default p or the
probability of bank failure FB.
Figure 1 shows the effects of changes in capital and reserve requirements on the
probability of bank failure (FB(xˆ)) (upper subplots) and on the lending rate (r)
(lower subplots). The effects are displayed for three different values of the (uncondi-
tional) probability of default (p). As can be seen, increases in capital requirements
induce a decline in the probability of bank failure and an increase in the lending
rate. This result is in line with Repullo and Suarez (2004). Different values of
the probability of default (p) do not change the shape of the curves, though their
positions.
The results are different in case of reserve requirements. An increase in reserve
requirements of around ten percentage points triggers an increase in the lending rate
of around two percentage points. This compares to an increase in the lending rate
of similar size in case of a ten percentage points increase in capital requirements.
Hence the overall effects of reserve and capital requirements on the interest rate
spread are similar. The opposite though holds for the effects on the probability of
bank failure. In this case the differences are significant. Higher reserve requirements
induce negligibly small changes in the probability of bank failure – visually these
changes cannot be recognised. In the case of capital requirements, the effects on the
probability of bank failure are sizeable: a rise in capital requirements of up to fifteen
percentage points triggers a decline in the probability of bank failure of around ten
percentage points – the effects are weaker the smaller the probability of default (p).
4The computations are carried out in Octave/Matlab. The programs are available upon request.
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Figure 1. Comparative statics
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The negative effects of higher reserve requirements on the probability of bank
failure depend on the extent to which higher interest revenues from non-defaulting
loans compensate the losses from defaulting loans. This gives rise to assessing the
effects of reserve requirements on the probability of bank failure with respect to
the degree of loan-default correlation – this is captured by the parameter ϱ. If
ϱ → 1 then loan default rates are perfectly correlated as in the set-up of Section
2.1. Figure 2 shows the effects of higher reserve and capital requirements on the
change in the probability of bank failure for different values of ϱ. As can be seen,
with a higher loan default correlation, rising reserve requirements lead to a larger
increase in the probability of bank failure. This shows that the contribution of
higher interest revenues from non-defaulting loans decreases when the degree of loan
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Figure 2. Comparative statics
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default correlation increases. Hence the presence of imperfectly correlated loan-
default attenuates the negative effects of higher reserve requirements on financial
stability as the higher interest revenues from non-defaulting loans provide a buffer
for the losses from defaulting loans.
3. Optimal contracting problem
In the previous section, banks decide upon the structure of their assets by solving
a portfolio problem which trades off expected returns and the risk of failure. This
setup ignores the existence of a loan market. Moreover, in this environment banks
can control the level of risk directly. Within the approach of the optimal contracting
problem, it is now entrepreneurs who are subject to a moral hazard problem. We
use a static model of Cournot competition in a market for entrepreneurial loans in
which the probability of default of loans is privately chosen by the entrepreneurs.
3.1. Reserves, capital and entrepreneurial risk-taking. The setup here fol-
lows the model of Boyd and De Nicolo´ (2005); Mart´ınez-Miera and Repullo (2010);
Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) who consider an economy with two types of risk neu-
tral agents: entrepreneurs and banks. We assume that the return of projects of
different entrepreneurs is perfectly correlated. This implies that the probability of
default of their loans coincides with the probability of bank failure.
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Entrepreneurs. There is a continuum of entrepreneurs who have no own resources,
but have access to risky projects that require a unit investment and yield a stochastic
return
(26) R˜(pi) =

 1 + α(pi), with probability 1− pi0, with probability pi
where the probability of failure pi ∈ [0, 1] is chosen privately by the entrepreneur.
As in Section 2.1 we assume that the success return of the project α(pi) > 0 is
concave with α′(0) > α(0) to get interior solutions.
To fund their projects entrepreneurs borrow from banks. Banks in turn cannot ob-
serve entrepreneurs’ risk-shifting choice pi, but take into account the best response
of entrepreneurs to their choice of the lending rate r. More specifically, the en-
trepreneurs’ choice of pi at the beginning of the contract is unobservable for banks.
Afterwards, banks observe only whether the project has been successful. In this
environment, banks have no direct control over the riskiness of borrowers’ projects.
For any given loan rate r entrepreneur i will choose pi in order to maximize the
expected payoff from undertaking the project, which is the success return net of the
interest payment, α(pi) − r, multiplied by the probability of success, 1 − pi, which
implies p(r) = argmaxpi(1− pi)(α(pi)− r). Hence for any given loan rate r, all en-
trepreneurs will choose the same pi = p(r) ∀ i, which allows to omit the i subscript.
By our previous assumptions, the entrepreneurs’ objective function (1−p)(α(p)−r)
is concave, so that p(r) is obtained by solving the first-order condition
(27) r = α(p)− (1− p)α′(p)
For 0 ≤ r < α(1) the solution will be interior. The corner p = 0 cannot be a solution
if α′(0)−α(0) + r > 0, which holds by the assumption α′(0) > α(0), and the corner
p = 1 cannot be a solution if −α(1) + r < 0, that is for r < α(1). Differentiating
the first-order condition (27) we get
(28) p′(r) =
−1
(1− p)α′′(p)− 2α′(p) > 0
which implies that a higher lending rate promotes risk-taking by entrepreneurs.
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Following Mart´ınez-Miera and Repullo (2010), we assume that each entrepreneur
is characterized by a continuous distribution of reservation utilities. Let Γ(u) denote
the measure of entrepreneurs that have a reservation utility less than or equal to u
and u(r) = maxp(1 − p)(α(p) − r) determines the maximum expected payoff that
entrepreneurs can obtain when the loan rate is r. By the envelope theorem we have
u′(r) = −(1−p(r)) < 0 and u′′(r) = p′(r) > 0. Entrepreneurs undertake the project
at the lending rate r if the reservation utility u is smaller than or equal to u(r).
Hence the measure of entrepreneurs that want to borrow from the banks at the
lending rate r is given by Γ(u(r)). Since each one requires a unit loan, the loan
demand function is
(29) L(r) = Γ(u(r))
Clearly for 0 ≤ r < α(1) we have L(r) > 0 with L′(r) = Γ′(u(r))u′(r) < 0 and
L′′(r) = Γ′(u(r))(u′(r))2 + Γ′(u(r))u′′(r) > 0. Let r(L) denote the corresponding
inverse loan demand function, which satisfies r′(L) < 0 and r′′(L) > 0.
Banks. The exposition of the banking sector closely follows Section 2.1. There is
a continuum of banks normalized to unity. Each bank i extends loans Li that are
financed by deposits Di and equity Ei. Additionally, banks have to hold reserves
Ri. As before, we assume that deposits are insured by a government-funded de-
posit scheme and, to simplify the presentation, we abstract from competition in
the deposit market by assuming that banks face a perfectly elastic supply of de-
posits at a rate equal to rD. Aggregate deposits in the banking sector are equal
to D =
∫ 1
0
Didi, the same applies for aggregate loans L =
∫ 1
0
Lidi and aggregate
reserves R =
∫ 1
0
Ridi. We assume that banks compete for loans a` la Cournot, so
the strategic variable of a bank is the supply of loans Li. Finally, we assume that a
regulator imposes a minimum reserve and capital requirement ς and k, i.e. Ei ≥ kLi
and Ri ≥ ςDi.
3.2. Equilibrium. We solve the model by backward induction and consider sym-
metric equilibria only. In a Nash equilibrium, each bank chooses loans and the
amount of reserves and capital to maximize profits, given similar choices of the
other banks and taking into account the entrepreneurs’ choice of the riskiness p of
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the projects. In this setup, banks lend to entrepreneurs whose returns are perfectly
correlated. This assumption is equivalent to the one taken in Section 2.1 on a bank
portfolio composed of perfectly correlated risks. This implies that the probability
of default of loans p(r(L)) coincides with the probability of bank failure FB.
Banks maximize the present discounted value of their net worth π(L) net of
bankers’ initial infusion of capital
(30) V = max
{L,k,ς}
[
−k + 1
1 + δ
π(L)
]
L
and the net worth per unit of loan π(L) is given by
(31) π(L) = [1− p(r(L))]
(
r(L) + k − rD 1− k
1− ς
)
Banks choose the profit maximizing volumes of loans L and decide upon how much
capital k and reserves ς to hold per unit of loan and deposit. Importantly, though,
is the fact that the aggregate supply of loans L determines the lending rate r(L),
which in turn determines the probability of failure chosen by the entrepreneurs as
implied by equation (27). Taken together, this motivates p(r(L)) being implicitly
defined by equations (27) and (29).
The first order conditions with respect to reserve holdings ς and capital holdings k
are equivalent to equations (6) and (7). As before, banks do not hold equity capital
and reserves in excess of what is required by prudential regulation. The first order
condition with respect to the amount of loans is given by
(32) r(L)− rD 1− k
1− ς =
1 + δ − g(L)
g(L)
k +G(L)
where g(L) ≡ 1 − p(r(L)) − Lp′(r(L))r′(L) > 0 since5 r′(L) < 0 and G(L) ≡
−[1−p(r(L))]r′(L)L
g(L))
> 0 with G′(L) > 0 as shown implicitly in Boyd and De Nicolo´
(2005). Equation (32) defines the equilibrium lending rate r(L) as a function of the
cost of equity
(
1+δ−g(L)
g(L)
k
)
, the cost of deposits
(
rD
1−k
1−ς
)
and some “monopoly rents”
captured by G(L). Equation (32) is to be compared with equation (8) from the
setup based on portfolio optimization. In contrast to equation (8), equation (32)
5Note that g(L) can be expressed in terms of risk and loan elasticities: g(L) = 1 +
p(r(L))
(
ηp(r)ηr(L) − 1
)
with ηp(r) ≡ p′(r(L))r(L)/p(r(L)) > 0 is the elasticity of entrepreneurs’
risk-taking with respect to the lending rate and ηr(L) ≡ −r′(L)L/r(L) > 0 is the elasticity of the
(inverse) loan demand function with respect to loans. Since ηp(r) ≥ 0 and ηr(L) ≥ 0, we have that
g(L) > 0; we exclude the boundary case characterized by ηp(r) = ηr(L) = 1− p(r(L)) = 0.
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contains the cost of capital δ. This is because in the model outlined in Section 2.1,
the volume of loans is irrelevant for banks’ profits; the only decisive factor is the
composition of loans in terms of the degree of risk they contain. Within the setup
of the optimal contracting problem, changes in the loan volume imply changes in
revenues due to the downward sloping inverse demand function r(L) for loans.
3.3. Implications of reserve and capital regulation. We now analyse how re-
serve and capital regulation affect the probability of bank failure. For this we focus
on the effects of prudential regulation on the degree of riskiness p(r(L)) of a single
loan and banks’ probability of default FB. By assumption, the return of projects
of different entrepreneurs is perfectly correlated. This implies that the probability
of entrepreneurs’ default on their loans p(r(L)) coincides with the probability of
bank failure FB = p(r(L)). We will see that (i) reserve requirements have a unique
effect on the probability of bank failure and (ii) the sign of the effects of capital
requirements on the probability of bank failure depends on reserve requirements.
We proceed stepwise to assess the effects of changes in reserve and capital re-
quirements. For this, we first determine their effects on loan supply. This result
will then be used to evaluate the effect on the lending rate and the degree of risk-
taking by entrepreneurs. From this we can then determine the probability of bank
failure. We define γ(L) ≡ G′(L) − r′(L) − k g′(L)(1+δ)
g(L)2
which satisfies γ(L) > 0 if
G′(L) − r′(L) > k g′(L)(1+δ)
g(L)2
which we assume applies. Considering the total differ-
ential of equation (32) we find the following for the partial effects of reserve and
capital requirements on loan supply
dL
dς
= − rD
γ(L)
1− k
(1− ς)2 < 0(33)
dL
dk
=
1
γ(L)
(
1− ς + rD
1− ς −
1 + δ
g(L)
)
< 0 if
1− ς + rD
1− ς <
1 + δ
g(L)
(34)
Since r(L) is the inverse demand function for loans, we have that dr(L)/dς > 0 and
dr(L)/dk > 0 if 1−ς+rD
1−ς
< 1+δ
g(L)
. Finally, taking the total differential of FB = p(r(L))
implies the following for the partial effect of reserve and capital requirements for the
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probability of bank failure
dFB
dς
= p′(r(L))r′(L)
dL
dς
> 0(35)
dFB
dk
= p′(r(L))r′(L)
dL
dk
> 0 if
1− ς + rD
1− ς <
1 + δ
g(L)
(36)
Equation (35) highlights that the overall effect of changes in reserve requirements
on the probability of bank failure depends on three components: (i) the extent to
which changes in reserves trigger changes in loan supply (dL/dς), (ii) the extent to
which changes in the loan supply affect the lending rate by means of the demand
function for loans (r′(L)), and (iii) the extent to which changes in the lending rate
affect risk-taking by entrepreneurs (p′(r(L))).
For a more intuitive explanation, consider an increase in the reserve requirement
ς. This implies that now a larger part of the deposit volume cannot be used for
loan supply. Hence higher reserve requirements render deposits more expensive
inducing banks to a reduction (substitution effect). The reduction in deposits could
in principle be counterbalanced with equity capital, however, this is not the case since
capital is only held to the amount necessary as required by prudential regulation
which is due to equation (7). Hence the decline in deposits brings about a decrease
in the aggregate loan volume L which translates into an increase in the lending
rate r(L). This in turn promotes higher risk-taking by entrepreneurs. Hence, a
tighter reserve regulation increases the risk of individual loans. Put differently,
reserve requirements do not contribute to financial stability as higher reserves fail
in ameliorating entrepreneurs’ moral hazard problem. Importantly, the size of the
adverse effects of higher reserve requirements crucially depends on entrepreneurs’
risk-taking sensitivity.
In this environment, capital requirements determine the size of the effects of
changes in reserve requirements on the probability of bank failure, though, they
leave the sign of the effects unchanged. The opposite, in turn, applies for capital
regulation as highlighted by equation (36). When ς → 0, then 1−ς+rD
1−ς
is comparably
small rendering more likely 1−ς+rD
1−ς
< 1+δ
g(L)
. In this case, stricter capital requirements
increase a bank’s probability of failure. This replicates Proposition 3 in Hakenes
and Schnabel (2011): an increase in the capital requirement raises capital costs,
which induces banks to choose lower deposit and loan volumes. The corresponding
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decrease in the aggregate loan volume L translates into an increase in the lending
rate and into higher risk-taking by entrepreneurs. Hence, a tighter capital regula-
tion increases the risk of individual loans because it exacerbates the entrepreneurs’
moral hazard problem. However, equation (36) highlights that this effect strongly
depends on the reserve regulation. When ς → 1, then 1−ς+rD
1−ς
is comparably large
with the likely consequence that 1−ς+rD
1−ς
> 1+δ
g(L)
. In this case dp(r(L))
dk
< 0, implying
that when reserve requirements are already high, increases in capital requirements
have the potential to reduce banks’ probability of failure.
This example highlights that, first of all, higher reserve requirements increase the
probability of bank failure since they promote entrepreneurial risk taking. Secondly,
the regulatory stance on reserve requirements determines not only the effectiveness
of capital requirements but, even more importantly, the sign.
3.4. Numerical results. In the following we use numerical methods to illustrate
the effects of reserve and capital requirements in an environment of optimal contract-
ing. We follow Mart´ınez-Miera and Repullo (2010) and utilize a simple parametriza-
tion based on the assumption of linearity for the inverse demand for loans r(L) and
the entrepreneurial risk-shifting function p(r). This allows us to quantitatively as-
sess the effects of changes in reserve and capital requirements on the probability of
bank failure FB = p(r(L)).
We postulate an entrepreneurial risk-shifting function p(r) and an inverse loan
demand function r(L) of the forms
(37) p(r) = a+ b · r and r(L) = c− d · L
with a > 0, b > 0, c > 0 and d > 0. In this setup, the parameter a characterizes the
probability of default of a project chosen by entrepreneurs when the lending rate r
is equal to zero (that is, the minimum default probability of a project) and the ratio
c/d gives the maximum volume of loans which occurs at a lending rate r equal to
zero.6 For the parametrization we take a = 0.01, b = 0.5, c = 1, and d = 0.01. This
6As highlighted in Mart´ınez-Miera and Repullo (2010), the linear functional form for p(r) can
be derived from a success return specification of the form α(p) = (1 − 2a + p)/2b which implies
the following for the expected payoff function: u(r) = (1 − a − br)2/2b. Finally, noting that
L(r) = Γ(u(r)), gives the following for the measure of entrepreneurs that have reservation utility
less than or equal to u: G(u) = (a+ bc− 1 +√2bu)/bd.
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Figure 3. Comparative statics
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means that the demand for loans goes from 100 to 0 as loan rates range from 0%
to 100%, and that the probability of default p that corresponds to a loan rate of
2% is equal to 2%. The default value chosen for reserve and capital requirements is
ς = k = 0.1.
Figure 3 shows the effects of changes in reserve and capital requirements on the
lending rate (r) and the probability of bank failure (FB) resulting from the model
which is characterized by equation (32) and the equations in (37). The simulations
distinguish between different degrees of entrepreneurs’ risk-taking sensitivity cap-
tured by the parameter b – higher values of b imply a higher sensitivity towards
risk. The subplots in the left panel of the figure highlight that higher reserve re-
quirements induce an increase in the probability of bank failure and the lending
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Figure 4. Comparative statics
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rate alike. This applies for any value of the risk-shifting parameter b. The higher
entrepreneurs’ risk sensitivity, the larger is the increase in the probability of bank
failure induced by increases in reserve requirements. The same applies to capital
requirements. If, in turn, b = 0, then changes in reserve and capital requirements
would leave the probability of bank failure unaffected as highlighted by equations
(35) and (36). Hence the effects of both reserve and capital requirements on the
probability of bank failure crucially depend on entrepreneurs’ risk-taking preference.
Figure 4 shows the effects of higher reserve and capital requirements on the proba-
bility of bank failure and the lending rate for concurrent values of capital and reserve
requirements of a certain amount. The effects of reserve requirements are shown for
two different values of capital requirements in the left panel of Figure 4. As can
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be seen, different values for capital requirements hardly change the shape of the
curve, though its position. Most importantly, capital requirements have no ability
in changing the sign of the effects of reserve requirements on the probability of bank
failure. The opposite applies to capital requirements. The two subplots in the right
panel of Figure 4 show that when reserve requirements are high, increases in capital
requirements contribute to ameliorate entrepreneurs’ moral hazard problem in the
choice of risk and hence to a decrease in the probability of bank failure. The oppo-
site applies at low values for reserve requirements. This example illustrates how the
interaction between reserve and capital requirements matters for the effectiveness
and even the sign of the effects of these regulatory tools.
4. The role of entrepreneurial risk-shifting and imperfectly
correlated loan default
As a final attempt to assess the role of reserve regulation on bank risk-taking, we
now consider its effects within a model that considers jointly the portfolio problem
and the optimal contracting problem. Specifically, we merge the models considered
in Sections 2.2 and 3 with minor changes. Hence the basic setup is identical to that
of Mart´ınez-Miera and Repullo (2010) except for the introduction of reserve and
capital regulation as motivated in Section 2.1.
Entrepreneurs. As in Section 3, we consider a continuum of entrepreneurs who have
no own resources, but have access to risky projects that require a unit investment
and yields a stochastic return
(38) R˜(pi) =

 1 + α(pi), with probability 1− pi1− λ, with probability pi
where 0 < λ < 1 is an individual project’s LGD and to simplify the presentation we
assume that it does not depend on pi. In contrast to Section 3.1, we now assume
that project failures and consequently loan defaults are imperfectly correlated. For
this we use the single risk factor model of Vasicek (2002), which introduces the
probability distribution of the aggregate failure rate x given by equation (13).
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Banks. The structure of the banking sector follows the setup of Section 2.2 and
Section 3.1 with minor modifications to account for the different risk environment.
Assuming that banks compete for loans a` la Cournot, so as in Section 3, the strategic
variable of a bank i is its supply of loans Li. Bank i’s net worth π(Li, L) per unit
of loan Li is again given by equation (14), though, it now depends on aggregate
loans L, which in turn results from the dependence of lending rates on the aggregate
volume of loans (r = r(L)). The bank fails when π(Li, L) < 0, that is, when the
default rate x is greater than the bankruptcy/default rate xˆ(L) which is given by
equation (18) and depends on loans L since the lending rate r(L) is now a function
of loans.7
As before, bank i’s objective is to maximize the expected discounted value of
max(π(Li, L), 0), net of bankers’ initial infusion of capital, which now reads
(39) Vi(Li) = Li ·
[
−k + 1
1 + δ
∫ xˆ(L)
0
π(L)dF (x; p(r(L)))
]
where the distribution function F (x; p(r(L))) of the default rate x is written so as to
account for the endogenous probability of default of the loans. Thus, when bank i
chooses its supply of loans Li, it takes into account (i) the direct effect of changes in
loan supply on the lending rate r(L), and (ii) the indirect effect on the probability of
default of the loans p(r(L)) and hence on the probability distribution of the default
rate x.
Bank i maximizes the expected discounted value Vi with respect to the amount of
capital k and reserves ς; optimization yields the same first order conditions as given
by equations (16) and (17). Hence, bank i will always hold the minimum amount
of reserves and capital as required by the regulation.
4.1. Equilibrium. In what follows, we identify the Cournot symmetric equilibrium
of the model of competition in the loan market with imperfectly correlated loan
default, and analyse the effect of changes in reserve and capital requirements on
the equilibrium lending rate r(L) and the equilibrium probability of bank failure
FB(L) = 1− F (xˆ(L); p(r(L))).
7Equivalently to Section 2.1, the bankruptcy/default rate xˆ(L) could also be derived formally by
considering ∂Vi/∂xˆ(L)
!
= 0.
29
The assumption of symmetry simplifies the model and implies Li = L. Using
equation (18) for the bankruptcy/default rate xˆ(L) and applying integration by
parts allows to re-write equation (39) in the following way
(40) V (L) = Lπ(L)
with π(L) being the net worth per unit of loan L given by
(41) π(L) = −k + λ+ r(L)
1 + δ
∫ xˆ(L)
0
F (x; p(r(L)))dx
The first order condition with respect to loans L yields the following first-order
differential equation
(42) π(L) = −Lπ′(L)
where π′(L) is given by
π′(L) =
r′(L)
1 + δ
[
(1− xˆ(L))F (xˆ(L); p(r(L))) +(43)
∫ xˆ(L)
0
(
F (x; p(r(L))) + (λ+ r(L))
∂F (x; p(r(L)))
∂p(r(L))
p′(r(L))
)
dx
]
and we used xˆ′(L) = 1−xˆ(L)
λ+r(L)
r′(L) < 0 as implied by equation (18). The first term in
square brackets in equation (43) is positive. The sign of the term within the integral
is ambiguous because F (x; p(r(L))) > 0, whereas ∂F (x;p(r(L)))
∂p(r(L))
< 0 (the effect on
the probability distribution of the bankruptcy/default rate) and p′(r(L)) > 0 (risk-
shifting effect). In line with Mart´ınez-Miera and Repullo (2010), we assume that the
parametrization and functional forms are such that π′(L) < 0 and π′′(L) < 0, so that
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. The complication arises from the effect of
the bankruptcy/default rate on the probability distribution
(
∂F (x;p(r(L)))
∂p(r(L))
< 0
)
. To
see this, assume that loan defaults are perfectly correlated (ϱ → 1). This implies
that F (x; p(r(L))) = 1−p(r(L)) for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and hence by using equation (18) and
(41) we obtain π(L) = [1− p(r(L))] (r(L) + k − rD 1−k1−ς ) which is the net worth per
unit of loan as given in equation (4) of the model based on the portfolio problem with
perfectly correlated loan default and it also corresponds to the net worth defined in
equation (31) of the model based on the optimal contracting problem with perfectly
correlated loan default. Moreover, the first order condition (42) is equal to the
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one given by equation (32) in Section 3 of the model with perfectly correlated loan
default.
4.2. Implications of reserve and capital regulation. We now use the first order
condition given by equation (42) to trace out the effects of reserve and capital
regulation. Taking the total differential and re-arranging results in the following for
the partial effect of reserve requirements on the probability of bank failure
(44)
dL
dς
= −L∂π
′(L)/∂ς + ∂π(L)/∂ς
2π′(L) + Lπ′′(L)
Given the previous assumptions on π(L), we note that the denominator is negative.
Since ∂xˆ(L)
∂ς
= − rD(1−k)
(λ+r(L))(1−ς)2
< 0, we get ∂π(L)/∂ς = λ+r(L)
1+δ
F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))∂xˆ(L)
∂ς
=
−rD 1−k(1+δ)(1−ς)2F (xˆ(L), p(r(L))) < 0 as implied by equation (16), and, noting that
∂π′(L)/∂ς = ∂2π(L)/∂L∂ς , we have
∂π′(L)
∂ς
=
r′(L)
1 + δ
(
(1− xˆ(L))∂F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))
∂xˆ(L)
+(45)
(λ+ r(L))
∂F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))
∂p(r(L))
p′(r(L))
)
∂xˆ(L)
∂ς
of which the first term in brackets is positive whereas the second term is negative.
Considering jointly ∂π(L)/∂ς and ∂π′(L)/∂ς within the nominator of equation (44)
implies that dL
dς
< 0 whenever the following condition holds
(46)
−F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))
Lr′(L)
− ∂F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))
∂p(r(L))
p′(r(L)) >
1− xˆ(L)
λ+ r(L)
∂F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))
∂xˆ(L)
In case of perfectly correlated loan default (ϱ → 1), the condition in equation (46)
reduces to−(1−p(r(L)))/Lr′(L)+p′(r(L)) !> 0, which is satisfied since r′(L) < 0 and
p′(r(L)) > 0. Hence, the presence of imperfectly correlated loan default introduces
the term ∂F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))/∂xˆ(L) > 0, which renders feasible an increase in loan
supply when reserve requirements are raised. In what follows, we rule out this
possibility and assume that the condition in equation (46) holds. It follows that
dL
dς
< 0, so that an increase in reserve requirements reduces loans. This in turn
implies that dr(L)/dς = r′(L)dL/dς > 0, hence higher reserve requirements raise
the lending rate.
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Given the effects of changes in reserve requirements on loans and the lending
rate, we can then identify the effect on the probability of bank failure. Banks fail
whenever the default rate x is greater than the bankruptcy/default rate xˆ(L) defined
in equation (18). We denote the equilibrium amount of loans with L∗, then from
the definition of the probability of bank failure we have (taking into account that
xˆ = xˆ(L) and p = p(r(L)))
(47)
dFB(L
∗)
dς
= −Φ
′(·)√
ϱ
[ √
1− ϱ
Φ′(Φ−1(xˆ(L∗))
∂xˆ(L∗)
∂ς
− p
′(r(L∗))r′(L∗)
Φ′(Φ−1(p(r(L∗)))
dL∗
dς
]
> 0
where ∂xˆ(L
∗)
∂ς
< 0 is given by equation (24). Since dL
∗
dς
< 0 it follows that dFB(L
∗)
dς
> 0
as both terms in brackets in equation (47) are negative. Hence, higher reserve
requirements increase the probability of bank failure. The first term of equation (47)
is equivalent to equation (21) of the setup in Section 2.2. The second term captures
the presence of entrepreneurs’ risk-shifting preference (p′(r(L)) > 0). As can be seen,
entrepreneurs’ moral hazard problem augments the adverse effects of higher reserve
requirements on financial stability compared to those already identified in Section
2.2. If p′(r(L)) = 0, then the current model reduces to the setup of Section 2.2. If in
turn loan default rates are perfectly correlated (ϱ→ 1 with FB(L)→ p(r(L))), then
equation (47) reduces to dFB(L
∗)
dς
= p′(r(L∗))r′(L∗)dL
∗
dς
> 0 which replicates equation
(35) of the setup in Section 3.
For capital requirements, we first assume that the condition stated in equation
(56) of Appendix B holds. This condition essentially implies that an increase in
capital requirements triggers a decrease in loan supply. Given this, we then obtain
the following partial effect on the probability of bank failure
(48)
dFB(L
∗)
dk
= −Φ
′(·)√
ϱ
[ √
1− ϱ
Φ′(Φ−1(xˆ(L∗))
∂xˆ(L∗)
∂k
− p
′(r(L∗))r′(L∗)
Φ′(Φ−1(p(r(L∗)))
dL∗
dk
]
R 0
Since ∂xˆ(L
∗)
∂k
> 0, as implied by equation (23), the presence of entrepreneurs’ risk-
shifting effect renders uncertain the overall effect of higher capital requirements on
the probability of bank failure. The first term in equation (48) is equivalent to
equation (22). The second term arises from entrepreneurs’ risk-shifting preference
and compares with equation (36) of the setup in Section 3.
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Figure 5. Comparative statics
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4.3. Numerical results. We again utilize numerical methods to illustrate the ef-
fects of reserve and capital requirements, now in an environment of optimal contract-
ing combined with imperfectly correlated loan default. For this we rely on the same
functional specifications for the inverse demand for loans and the entrepreneurial
risk-shifting function as in Section 3.4 and focus on a quantitative assessment of
the effects of changes in reserve and capital requirements on the probability of bank
failure FB(L) and the lending rate r(L).
Figure 5 shows the effects of changes in reserve and capital requirements on the
lending rate (r) and the probability of bank failure (FB) resulting from the model
characterized by equations (13), (18), (42), the equations in (37) and the definitions
for π(L) and π′(L) given by equations (41) and (43). The simulations distinguish
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between various degrees of entrepreneurs’ risk-taking sensitivity which is captured
by the parameter b.
The subplots in the left panel of the figure highlight that higher reserve require-
ments induce increases in the probability of bank failure and the lending rate alike.
Higher reserve requirements induce a decline in loan supply and an increase in the
lending rate, which in turn leads to a higher probability of loan default due to en-
trepreneurs’ moral hazard problem. The final increase in the probability of bank
failure is triggered by two effects (i) the higher probability of loan default (p(r(L)))
and (ii) the decrease in the bankruptcy/default rate (xˆ(L)).
This applies for any values of the risk-shifting parameter b. The higher en-
trepreneurs’ moral hazard problem, the larger is the increase in the probability
of bank failure induced by increases in reserve requirements. When entrepreneurs’
moral hazard problem is absent (b = 0), then the model replicates the setup of Sec-
tion 2.2 in which higher reserve requirements still cause an increase in the probability
of bank failure, however, these effects are small from a quantitative perspective (see
Figure 1 for comparison) as in this case the effect from higher interest revenues of
non-defaulting loans weighs stronger and hence dampens the adverse effects.
The opposite applies for capital requirements. Higher capital requirements trigger
a reduction in the probability of bank failure. The size of the reduction in response to
higher regulatory requirements crucially depends on the degree of the entrepreneurial
risk-taking preference. When entrepreneurs’ moral hazard problem is pronounced
(high values of b), then increases in capital requirements trigger comparably large
reductions in the probability of bank failure. This is due to the fact that when
risk-taking is high, small increases in the probability of loan default (p(r(L))) trig-
ger comparably large changes in the lending rate (r(L)). This raises revenues to
banks accruing from non-defaulting loans. In principle, this effect applies to reserve
requirements, however, it is always dominated by the effect of reserve requirements
on the bankruptcy/default rate as discussed in detail in Section 2.2.1.
5. Discussion
Reserve requirements relate a part of banks’ assets to liabilities; in the case of
capital requirements it is the opposite. Common to both is that each of the two
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regulatory instruments induces a contraction in loan supply (see for instance Aiyar
et al., 2016; Malovana´ and Frait, 2017). Despite the fact that reserve and capital
requirements seem to have a similar effect on banks’ balance sheets and lending rates,
their effects on financial stability are different. This addresses the composition of
banks’ assets with respect to the risk exposure.
In what follows, we discuss a key policy implication of this study, that is, the role
of reserve requirements for procyclicality. Additionally, we elaborate on a model
specific aspect. We start with the latter.
5.1. The role of monitoring. The previous sections rely on the assumption that
banks’ engagement ends with the loan disbursement. In fact, banks monitor their
loan portfolio to ensure that changes in borrowers’ finances or circumstances do
not put repayment in jeopardy. In this context, monitoring is based on the idea
that changes in the risk environment are taken into account by banks by means
of re-adjusting the monitoring intensity of the loan portfolio. Banks can increase
the probability of getting a higher return simply by exerting a monitoring effort.
Considering monitoring in relation to reserve requirements seems peculiar at first
sight, however, it is a natural extension of the previous analysis. As outlined before,
higher reserve requirements induce a decline in profits as part of deposits remains
un-invested. This incentivizes banks to accept loans with a higher success return r˜
in order to compensate for the loss. These loans are, however, riskier, that is the
probability of loan default p is higher. The higher share of riskier loans increases the
default probability of banks. Monitoring enables banks to counteract the increase
in risk in their loan portfolio. On the one hand monitoring incurs some cost, on the
other it increases the probability of getting the high return r˜ given a particular level
of probability p of loan default. Equivalently, given a particular rate of return r˜,
monitoring allows for a decline in the probability of default. Hence, if higher reserve
requirements induce an increase in monitoring, then we can expect a decline in the
probability of default at a given rate of return r˜.
We consider this idea in Section C of the Appendix where we extend the model
of Section 2.1 with monitoring. The basic results are: the more successful a bank’s
monitoring efforts are, that is the more likely the bank can obtain higher lending
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rates by means of monitoring, the more likely it is that increases in reserve require-
ments cause a decline in the probability of bank failure. The crucial element behind
this result is the size of the elasticity of the lending rate with respect to the prob-
ability of loan default relative to the size of the elasticity of the lending rate with
respect to the monitoring intensity. Further details can be found in Section C of the
Appendix.
5.2. Procyclicality. The previous results tell a cautionary tale on the usefulness of
reserve requirements as a tool to contain the degree of procyclicality of the financial
system. In this respect most papers of the macroeconomic literature argue that first
of all reserve requirements can serve as a countercyclical tool to manage the credit
cycle in a broad context since they limit an excessive leverage of borrowers in the up-
swing and operate as a liquidity buffer in the downswing (see the papers cited in the
Introduction). Second, reserve requirements can help to contain risk accumulation
by improving the liquidity of the banking system. Regarding reserve requirements as
a countercyclical tool – the first argument – what these papers ignore, is the extent
to which a decline in loan supply and a corresponding increase in the lending rate
might lead to a completely different outcome once banks’ and entrepreneurs’ moral
hazard problem is taken into account. As higher reserve requirements promote risk-
taking, an increase during the upswing of the cycle could lead to an even stronger
appetite for risk and thus lead to unintended policy outcomes. In this environment
a reduction in reserve requirements rather than an increase might attenuate the
degree of procyclicality.
Regarding the second argument – reserve requirements as a liquidity buffer – Carl-
son (2015) describes how the aim of reserve requirements in 19th century America
was to ensure that banks had sufficient liquidity to meet outflows in times of stress
without reducing lending. In practice, banks generally met these requirements8, but
failed to use them as a buffer under stress. Instead, when faced with increased risk,
banks would contract credit supply augmenting the overall degree of procyclicality.
Reducing reserve requirements in this case might seem promising in this context at
first sight, however, as Cecchetti and Kashyap (2018) argue, the impact of a reserve
8At that time reserve requirements in the US ranged from 15% to 25% of deposits, which compares
to a current value of 2%. Nowadays in some emerging market economies reserve requirements
amount to even 50% and higher.
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requirement change is difficult to predict and is likely to have an inherent asym-
metry. For instance, if banks are capital-impaired or increasingly sceptical about
borrowers’ financial conditions, then a cut in reserve requirements might simply
end up in higher excess reserves rather than in an increase in loan supply. In this
context, also Diamond and Kashyap (2016); Cecchetti and Kashyap (2018) remain
concerned about the usability of the liquidity buffer in form of reserve requirements.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to provide a framework for analysing the impact of reserve
requirements on financial stability. To this purpose, we consider a banking model
that is subject to legal reserve requirements. Based on the results presented here, an
increase in regulatory reserve requirements promotes risk-taking as either borrowers
or banks have an incentive to choose riskier assets. Hence banks’ probability of
failure rises. The key elements of the analysis can be summarized as follows:
First, higher reserve requirements raise costs as only a part of the stock of de-
posits can be used for investment purposes. Banks try to counterbalance these
higher costs by financing assets with a higher success return. These assets, how-
ever, are characterised by a higher probability of default, which in turn increases
the probability of bank failure. Hence, there is a risk-shifting effect. This effect is
attenuated once imperfectly correlated loan default is taken into account. In par-
ticular, as higher reserve requirements induce a shift towards assets with a higher
success return, the corresponding increase in interest payments from non-defaulting
loans provides a buffer to cover losses from defaulting loans. This effect is opposite
to the risk-shifting effect and hence dampens the adverse effects of higher reserve
requirements on the probability of bank failure. In contrast to that, the adverse ef-
fects are augmented once borrowers’ moral hazard problem is taken into account. In
this case, higher reserve requirements cause a decline in loan supply and an increase
in the lending rate. The latter, in turn, promotes higher risk-taking by borrowers,
rendering worse the overall conditions for financial stability. Importantly, the size of
the adverse effects increases with borrowers’ risk-shifting sensitivity. Hence, reserve
requirements do not contribute to financial stability as they fail in ameliorating
borrowers’ and banks’ moral hazard problem.
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Second, even though changes in capital and reserve requirements have comparably
similar effects on banks’ balance sheets, their implications for financial stability are
rather distinct. While both requirements affect loan supply and lending rates in the
same way, reserve requirements promote risk-taking, whereas capital requirements
(mostly) mitigate risk-taking.
The theoretical results presented here are in line with empirical findings. This
suggests a cautionary tale of reserve requirements as a regulatory instrument for
financial stability purposes. Moreover, the results also raise concerns regarding the
new liquidity standards proposed by Basel III, as they share common features with
reserve requirements.
As a final remark – an outlook for future research. The analysis presented here was
conducted within a partial equilibrium framework. At times, this requires strong
(restrictive) assumptions which might render the results less credible. A possible
extension is the attempt to integrate the model building blocks presented here into
a general equilibrium framework. The DSGE models as mentioned in the Introduc-
tion are particularly tempting for this purpose. In this context, the macroeconomic
effects could be assessed jointly with the implications for financial stability within
an environment that adequately captures the interdependencies among distinct eco-
nomic agents. To the extent that reserve requirements have already been analysed in
this model environment, an extension along these thoughts comprises an interesting
contribution to the existing literature on this issue.
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Appendix A. Derivation of the distribution function of the default
rate
This section provides details for Sections 2.2 and 4, where we consider imperfectly
correlated loan default. For this we utilize the Vasicek (2002) model, which itself is
based on the Merton (1974) model of credit risk.
There are many identical borrowers, indexed by i, of a continuum of measure one.
The outcome of the investment project of borrower i is driven by the realization of
a latent random variable yi given by
(49) yi = µi +
√
ϱ z +
√
1− ϱ ϵi
where z is the macroeconomic risk factor that affects all projects, ϵi is an idiosyn-
cratic risk factor that only affects the project of firm i, µi is a constant parameter
and measures the financial vulnerability of firm i, and ϱ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that
determines the exposure of firm i to the macroeconomic risk factor z. The project
of firm i is successful if yi ≥ 0; in this case, the project yields a gross return of 1+a.
If it fails, the project only yields 1− λ; hence λ determines the loss given firm i de-
faults (loss given default, LGD). From equation (49) we have that the unconditional
distribution of the latent variable satisfies yi ∼ N(µi, 1), so that the unconditional
probability of default (pi) of the investment project of firm i is then given by
(50) pi = Pr(yi ≤ 0) = Pr
(√
ϱ z +
√
1− ϱ ϵi ≤ −µi
)
= Φ(−µi)
or equivalently Φ(−µi) = 1− Φ(µi); equation (50) implies
(51) µi = −Φ−1(pi)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a standard normal
random variable and Φ−1(·) its inverse. As equation (51) points out, the parameter
µi describes the distance-to-default of borrower i; accordingly, the probability of
default of borrower i is Φ(−µi). Borrower i repays the loan when yi ≥ 0, where
yi = −Φ−1(pi) +√ϱ z +
√
1− ϱ ϵi. Notice that for ϱ = 0 the macroeconomic risk
factor does not play any role and we have statistically independent failures, while for
ϱ = 1 the idiosyncratic risk factor vanishes and we have perfectly correlated failures.
Conditional on the macroeconomic risk factor z, defaults are independent. In what
follows, we focus on the imperfect correlation case: ϱ ∈ (0, 1).
Consider now the continuum of firms that want to undertake their projects when
the lending rate is r. By our previous argument, they all choose the same probability
of failure pi = p. But then the failure rate x is only a function of the realization of the
macroeconomic risk factor z. Specifically, by the law of large numbers, the failure
rate x coincides with the probability of default of a project of a representative firm
i conditional on the realization of the macroeconomic risk factor z. Note that from
equation (49) we have that ∀i the distribution of the latent variable yi conditional
on the realization of the systematic risk factor z is: yi|z ∼ N
(
µi +
√
ϱ z, 1− ϱ), so
that the conditional probability of default or default rate of firm i is
η(z) = Pr (yi| z ≤ 0) = Pr
(
µi +
√
ϱ z +
√
1− ϱ ϵi
∣∣∣ z ≤ 0)
= Φ
(
Φ−1(p)−√ϱ z√
1− ϱ
)
(52)
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where we have used equation (50) to re-write the financial vulnerability parameter
µi as a simple non-linear transformation of the unconditional probability of default
Φ−1(p). Hence the default rate η(z) is increasing in the unconditional probability of
default (p) and in the realization of the macroeconomic risk factor z. The quantity
η(z) provides the loan default probability under a given scenario for the macroeco-
nomic risk factor z. The unconditional probability of default p is the average of the
default probabilities over the scenarios. The cumulative distribution function of the
default rate η(z) is given by
F (x) = Pr(η(z) ≤ x) = Pr
(
Φ
(
Φ−1(p)−√ϱ z√
1− ϱ
)
≤ x
)
= 1− Pr
(
z ≤ Φ
−1(p)−√1− ϱ Φ−1(x)
−√ϱ
)
= 1− Φ
(√
1− ϱ Φ−1(x)− Φ−1(p)
−√ϱ
)
= Φ
(√
1− ϱ Φ−1(x)− Φ−1(p)√
ϱ
)
(53)
where we used the fact that z ∼ N(0, 1). For ϱ ∈ (0, 1) the cumulative distribution
function F (x) is continuous and increasing with limx→0 F (x) = 0 and limx→1 F (x) =
1. Moreover, the mean of the distribution of the default rate η(z) is the probability of
default p of the corresponding class of loans, while the variance is entirely determined
by the degree of exposure ϱ to the macroeconomic risk factor z.
Note that ∂F (·)
∂p
< 0, so that changes in the probability of failure p lead to a first
order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of the failure rate p, and ∂F (·)
∂ϱ
≥ 0
if and only if p ≤ Φ (√1− ϱ Φ−1(p)), so changes in the correlation parameter ϱ
lead to a mean-preserving spread (a second order stochastic dominance shift) in
the distribution of the failure rate η(z). Note also that when ϱ → 0 (independent
failures) the distribution of the failure rate approaches the limit F (x) = 0, for
x < p, and F (x) = 1, for x ≥ p. The single mass point at x = p implies that a
fraction of the projects fails with a probability of one. And when ϱ → 1 (perfectly
correlated failures) the distribution of the failure rate approaches the limit F (x) =
Φ (−Φ−1(p)) = 1 − Φ (Φ−1(p)) = 1 − p, for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. The mass point at x = 0
implies that with probability 1 − p no project fails, and the mass point at x = 1
implies that with probability p all projects fail.
Appendix B. Capital requirements and bank failure - technical
details
This section complements Section 4 and provides the technical details as regards
the effects of changes in capital requirements on the probability of bank failure in
the model characterised by the optimal contracting problem jointly with imperfectly
correlated loan default.
The effects of capital requirements k on loan supply L can be characterized by
the following
(54)
dL
dk
= −L∂π
′(L)/∂k + ∂π(L)/∂k
2π′(L) + Lπ′′(L)
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In comparison to equation (47), an increase in capital requirements triggers a de-
cline in loan supply if the nominator in equation (54) is negative. Noting that
∂π(L)
∂k
= −1 + λ+r(L)
1+δ
F (xˆ(L), p(r(L)))∂xˆ(L)
∂k
and ∂xˆ(L)
∂k
= 1−ς+rD
(λ+r(L))(1−ς)
, we hence have
that ∂π(L)
∂k
= −1+ 1−ς+rD
(1+δ)(1−ς)
F (xˆ(L), p(r(L))) < 0 as implied by equation (17). More-
over, we find that
∂π′(L)
∂k
=
r′(L)
1 + δ
(
(1− xˆ(L))∂F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))
∂xˆ(L)
+(55)
(λ+ r(L))
∂F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))
∂p(r(L))
p′(r(L))
)
∂xˆ(L)
∂k
Focusing now on the implications of that for equation (54), dL/dk < 0 if the nu-
merator is negative. This is the case if the following condition is satisfied
−∂F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))
∂p(r(L))
p′(r(L)) <
ζ˜
Lr′(L)
+
1− xˆ(L)
λ+ r(L)
∂F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))
∂xˆ(L)
(56)
where ζ˜ ≡
[
−1 + 1−ς+rD
(1+δ)(1−ς)
F (xˆ(L); p(r(L)))
]
(1+δ)(1−ς)
1−ς+rD
= ∂π(L)
∂k
(1+δ)(1−ς)
1−ς+rD
, which sat-
isfies ζ˜ < 0 as implied by equation (17). The right hand side of equation (56) is
positive and so is the left hand side since ∂F (xˆ(L);p(r(L)))
∂p(r(L))
< 0. In general, condition
(56) is more restrictive than condition (46). To see this, consider the case of perfectly
correlated loan default (ϱ = 1). Condition (56) reduces to p′(r(L))
!
< ζ˜
Lr′(L)
, which
is in general more restrictive as the equivalent condition for reserve requirements
(see Section 4.2 and also Section 3.3).
Note, combining condition (46) and condition (56) implies the following
(57) 0 <
(1 + δ)(1− ς)
1− ς + rD
which is satisfied as long ς ∈ [0, 1). This implies that if we have that dL/dς < 0, it
follows that dL/dk < 0 too.
Appendix C. Monitoring in a setup of perfectly correlated loan
default
This section highlights the effects of monitoring in the model outlined in Section
2.1 which is comprised by perfectly correlated loan default. The easier exposition
allows to elaborate on the importance of the sensitivity of the lending rate with
respect to monitoring for characterising the effects of changes in reserve and capital
requirements on the probability of bank failure.
Monitoring increases the probability of obtaining a high return r(p,m), but entails
some cost c(m) where m ∈ [0, p] is the monitoring intensity. Within this extension,
the case m = 0 can be associated with banks that originate-to-distribute and the
case m > 0 with traditional banks that originate-to-hold. The monitoring cost
function c(m) satisfies c(0) = c′(0), c′(m) > 0, c′′(m) > 0, and c′′′(m) ≥ 0. We
assume that monitoring is not observed by depositors; however, since deposits are
fully insured, depositors do not care how much effort the bank exerts in monitoring
its loan portfolio.
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Each bank has an investment that yields a stochastic return r˜ given by
(58) r˜ =
{
r(p,m), with probability 1− p+m
0, with probability p−m
with r(p,m) being concave in both arguments and rm(p,m) ̸= rp(p,m); for simplicity
we assume that rm,p(p,m) = rp,m(p,m) = 0.
The equation for the net worth of a bank reads
(59) π(p) = (1− p+m)
(
1 + r(p,m)− (1 + rD − ς)1− k
1− ς
)
− c(m)
Banks maximize the presented discounted value, which implies the following first
order conditions
∂V
∂k
= −1 + (1− p+m)(1 + rD − ς)
(1 + δ)(1− ς) < 0(60)
∂V
∂ς
= −rD (1− p+m)(1− k)
(1 + δ)(1− ς)2 < 0(61)
As in Section 2.1, these two first order conditions imply that banks will always
hold the minimum amount of capital k and reserves ς as required by the prudential
regulation. The first order conditions with respect to the monitoring intensity m
and the risk level p are
c′(m) = k + r(p,m)− rD 1−k1−ς + (1− p+m)rm(p,m)(62)
(1− p+m)rp(p,m) = k + r(p,m)− rD 1−k1−ς(63)
Combining the latter two equations and computing the total differential yields the
partial effect of monitoring on the probability of bank failure
(64)
dp
dm
=
c′′(m)− (1− p+m)rmm − rp − rm
(1− p+m)rpp − rp − rm ≷ 0
In what follows we assume that c′′(m) − (1 − p + m)rmm > rp + rm as otherwise
the bank would refrain from monitoring at all9; with this assumption it holds that
dp(m)
dm
< 0. Using equation (63) and computing the total differential to isolate the
effect of changes in regulatory reserve requirements on the monitoring intensity
yields dm(k,ς)
dς
= −rD 1−k(1−ς)2 1rp−rm . Combining the two partial derivatives implies the
following for the probability of bank failure with respect to reserve requirements
(65)
dp(k, ς)
dς
=
dp
dm
dm
dς
{
< 0, if rp < rm
> 0, if rp > rm
Since dp(m)
dm
< 0, the sign of the effect of reserve requirements on the probability of
bank failure p is determined by dm(k,ς)
dς
. Hence the effects depend on the sensitivity
of the monitoring intensity with respect to reserve requirements. If sizeable changes
in the lending rate are triggered by small adjustments in monitoring as opposed to
the risk level, then increases in regulatory reserve requirements induce a rise in the
monitoring intensity and a decline in the probability of bank failure.
The intuition is the following: higher reserve requirements push up costs; banks
can react to that by means of two possibilities: (i) to cut back monitoring intensity
so as to save on monitoring costs and equilibrate costs or (ii) to increase monitoring
9This is equivalent to assuming that: (1− p+m) [c′′(m)− (1− p+m)rmm] > c′(m).
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so as to take on assets with a higher success return and a comparably low risk level
p. Which possibility to choose depends on the sensitivity of the lending rate with
respect to its two arguments: if lending rates react only weakly to higher monitoring,
then the gain from intensifying monitoring is small, hence banks will choose the first
possibility and cut monitoring all together. In this case, higher reserve requirements
trigger a decline in monitoring and an increase in the probability of bank failure as
banks try to compensate the loss of higher required reserve holdings by means of
taking on loans with a higher success return; these loans, however, are comprised
by a higher risk level. Hence the probability of bank default increases in this case.
This resembles the implications of Section 2.1.
If in turn lending rates react strongly to changes in monitoring, then banks can
achieve higher lending rates even without having to accept an increase in the risk
level p, or equivalently, to achieve a decline in the risk level without having to
accept a drop in lending rates. As a consequence, higher reserve requirements cause
a decline in the probability of bank failure and hence promote bank stability; even in
this case, however, the extent to which an increase in reserve requirements induces
higher costs remains an essential element for the transmission mechanism.
As regards capital requirements, the partial effect of k on the monitoring intensity
is given by: dm(k,ς)
dk
= 1+rD−ς
1−ς
1
rp−rm
; combining the latter expression with equation
(64) yields the partial effect of capital requirements on the probability of bank failure
(66)
dp(k, ς)
dk
=
dp
dm
dm
dk
{
> 0, if rp < rm
< 0, if rp > rm
Obviously, if the sensitivity of lending rates with respect to the risk level p is higher
than with respect to the monitoring intensity m, increases in capital requirements
promote lower risk-taking by banks. Equations (65) and (66) imply that dp(k,ς)
dς
∝
−dp(k,ς)
dk
.
